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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FLORENCE J. ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LAMAR ANDERSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8169 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except in unimportant details, the respondent agrees 
fully with appellant's statement of facts down to the bottom 
of page two of his brief. Thereafter, respondent disagrees 
with the argumentative matter comprising the first para-
graph on page three of appellant's brief and also the last 
full sentence on page four of his brief, beginning "That the 
wife * * * ." One additional point of disagreement as 
to the facts will be mentioned later. Others are not consid-
ered important. 
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It is felt, however, that the generally accurate state-
ment of the facts given in appellant's brief should be sup-
plemented here in order that the Court might have a more 
complete picture in proper perspective. 
The parties hereto were divorced by a decree entered 
on September 26, 1949. An August 26, 1952, judgment 
against the appellant and for the plaintiff-respondent was 
given for $4,484.41 unpaid support-money, plus fees and 
costs, and the appellant was adjudged in contempt. Sen-
tence for contempt was suspended on condition of payment 
of certain installments by appellant. On February 10, 1953, 
appellant's commitment to jail was ordered because of his 
default in making payments. On May 4, 1953, the appel-
lant, having failed to appeal in the meantime, filed a peti-
tion to vacate the orders of August 26th and February lOth 
under U. R. C. P. 60 (b) (5, 7). The court below dismissed 
the petition to vacate on February 23, 1954, and appellant 
appeals this dismissal. 
As stated in appellant's brief, the stipulation and agree-
ment providing for the division of property between the 
parties hereto, which was made a part of the divorce decree, 
provided that half the proceeds from the sale of certain 
property in Arizona should go to the wife in lieu of alimony. 
The other half of the proceeds of such sale was to be the 
property of the husband. It was to be placed in trust and 
paid to the wife at the rate of $250.00 per month, in satisfac-
tion of the husband's obligation to support his children, 
until it was exhausted; whereupon the husband was to con-
tinue support for the children from his other property or 
income but at the lesser rate of $200.00 per month. Either 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
party could sell the property, and it was to be sold forth-
with. No express provision in the agreement or divorce 
decree considered the possibility that the property could 
not be sold. 
A hearing was had on August 22, 1952, upon an order 
to show cause why the wife should not be given judgment 
for unpaid support money at the rate of $200.00 per month 
from the date of the decree. The wife's efforts to sell the 
property had been unsuccessful. The husband testified that 
he had gone to Arizona several times to sell the property 
in question, but that his wife wouldn't cooperate with him 
in selling it; and that real estate companies would not list 
the property because his wife wouldn't sign papers of some 
kind or other (R. 47). When pressed, he admitted that he 
had never listed the property with anyone for sale, but he 
thought that he had advertised it in the paper (R. 55 line 
25 toR. 56 line 4). 
On the other hand, the wife testified at the hearing that 
the property was listed constantly between the time of the 
divorce decree and the time of the hearing with eight or ten 
different real estate companies (R. 67), and that she had 
advertised the property in the papers almost every week 
until she left Arizona and went to Texas (R. 69) to work 
(R. 72). Exhibit C was admitted in evidence without ob-
jection. It is a letter from an Arizona realtor certifying 
that the property in question had been listed with him con-
tinuously since September 30, 1949, (four days after the 
decree) by the wife, on open listing, and that no reasonable 
offer had been received (R. 67). Exhibit C is part of the 
record and available for the Court's inspection. 
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The husband testified that the wife told him and 
her uncle that she had been offered $8500.00 for the prop-
erty and had refused to take it (R. 48). As to this, the 
wife testified that the husband misunderstood her state-
ment; that the husband had told her and Browne, her at-
torney in the divorce action, that the property was worth 
$10,000.00; that she listed it with a company for $10,-
000.00, but that the company representative, after looking 
at the property, said that it was so valueless they hated to 
show property of that type; that she had then asked if they 
could get $7,000.00 or $8,000.00 for it, and the agent said 
he would try; and that she had told the husband of this, thus 
the misunderstanding (R. 71). She had never rejected an 
offer of $8,000.00 (R. 71). Indeed, the only offer she had 
received for the property was one of $1500.00, which was 
later withdrawn because zoning regulations or some other 
such obstacle made it impossible for the offeror to 
tear down the shacks on it and use it for parking (R. 69). 
The record does not sustain appellant's statement on page 
five of his brief that the wife had been informed by a 
realtor that she might get seven or eight thousand. She said 
further, as to the value of the property, that she had an 
appraisal on it of $2900.00, made six to twelve months prior 
to the hearing (R. 71, 72); but that the property would 
not be worth this sum at the time of the hearing because 
termites had since damaged the buildings, implying that 
they had been condemned (R. 72). The oniy reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the record is that the $2900.00 
appraisal was for sale and not a tax appraisal (R. 71, 72). 
That counsel for both parties so treated it is shown clearly 
by the record (R. 81). 
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illt The husband also said that he was advised by Browne, 
~1· who drew the property agreement and represented the wife 
~~~ in the divorce action, not to pay support money (R. 49, 
llf 64). This testimony does not harmonize with Exhibit A, 
admitted in evidence and now in the record on appeal, 
:r; being a letter to the wife from Browne (R. 64, 65). Browne 
J:i identified Exhibit A as his letter (R. 76). 
Under the agreement, any income from the property 
prior to sale was to go to the wife. The husband testified 
that the property produced from $150 to $180 per month in 
rents; that each time he went to Arizona he tried to im-
prove the property by trying to get the pe.ople to paint it; 
and that the caretaker of the property was paid from its 
income (R. 51, R. 52 lines 1 and 2). The wife said, how-
ever, that income from the property had been only enough 
to pay for utilities ; that in fact the property was a liability 
to her because it was not even self-supporting; and that 
taxes were owing on the property itself, as well as on her 
home (R. 67, 68). 
The agreement had awarded the husband a hotel prop-
erty which he said he sold for around $4200.00, netting 
around $3800.00 after taxes; and he said that he had given 
the wife all of that (R. 58). His cross-petition, however, 
stated that he had paid $2515.59 to her since the divorce 
(R. 21), and a stipulation to this effect was entered at the 
hearing (R. 42). He offered no books of account, con-
celled checks, nor other evidence of the alleged payments 
in excess of the stipulated amount. 
In addition to the taxes owing on the property and her 
home, mentioned above, the wife testified that she had 
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recently borrowed $250.00 for current expenses, and that 
for the month of the hearing she was in debt for about 
$200.00 (R. 69). The record is clear that this $200.00 did · 
not include the taxes. Though the record is not completely 
clear on the point, it seems more reasonable to infer that the 
$200.00 debt was in addition to the $250.00 borrowed for 
current expenses. On cross-examination, she broke the 
$200.00 item down into individual debts totalling $195.00 
(R. 72). 
The wife was earning $265.00 per month at the time 
of the hearing, but she had to work for twelve to eighteen 
hours a day on two jobs to do that (R. 72, 73). She had 
started working for $130.00 per month after the decree 
(R. 72). 
The court will no doubt be impressed with the fact that 
the husband was less than a model of candor as he testified. 
It is not difficult to understand, upon reading the record 
of his evasive, equivocal, and ambiguous testimony, why 
the court below believed the wife rather than him. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPEL-
LANT WAS COMMITTED BY THE COURT 
BELOW IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S 
PETITION TO VACATE. 
POINT II. 
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S PETITION TO 
VACATE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE 
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:L REASON THAT IT WAS NOT FILED WITH-
;r:r IN A REASONABLE TIME AS REQUIRED BY 
RULE 60(b). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
NO ERROR PREJUDICIAL TO THE APPEL-
LANT WAS COMMITTED BY THE COURT 
BELOW IN DISMISSING THE APPELLANT'S 
PETITION TO VACATE. 
This appeal is not taken from the orders or judgments 
of August 26, 1952 (R. 26, 27), and February 10, 1953 (R. 
28, 30), but rather from the order of February 23, 1954 (R. 
86), dismissing appellant's petition to vacate those prior 
orders. It is significant and important to note that the ap-
pellant did not prosecute an appeal from either of the prior 
orders sought now to be vacated, nor has the appellant 
offered this Court any explanation nor a single excuse for 
this failure to appeal. At the time he petitioned the court 
below to vacate the prior judgments, his time for taking an 
appeal had lapsed for both of them. 
The petition to vacate was filed on May 4, 1953, and 
hearing thereon was had September 12, 1953. The minute 
entry (R. 36) shows that no evidence was taken at the hear-
ing, but that the proceedings consisted only of argument 
by counsel, whereupon the matter was taken under ad-
visement. The record does not reveal what points were 
raised and argued by counsel. Since no evidence was taken, 
however, it is clear that appellant's petition was supported 
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solely by the record of the case up to that time, and by 
nothing else. 
Appellant brought his petition to vacate before the 
court under the aegis of 60 (b) (5, 7), U. R. C. P., (R. 34) 
which is identical to 60 (b) ( 4, 6) , Federal R. C. P. This 
rule provides that a party, on motion, may be relieved by 
the court from a final judgment or order, in the furtherance 
of justice, if * * * ( 5) the judgment is void, or * * * 
(7) any other reason exists justifying relief from its oper-
ation. The motion is required to be made within a reason-
able time for the two causes stated. 
To justify relief under 60 (b), appellant alleged in his 
petition to vacate that (1) the judgments sought to be 
vacated were unjust because they were contrary to the 
property agreement between the parties, and that (2) 
they were void because they were contrary to the terms 
of the divorce decree (R. 33). On appeal, however, appel-
lant contends in his brief only that he should have been 
given the relief sought because the judgments of August 
26 and February 10 were erroneous. In so doing, appel-
lant errs in his tacit assumption that the same grounds 
for relief on direct appeal from the challenged judgments 
are grounds for relief from those judgments under Rule 
60 (b) (5, 7). Respondent denies this basic assumption of 
the appellant. Under the facts and circumstances of this 
case, the assumption is invalid. 
As stated, the sole basis in his brief, for appellant's 
allegation of error in the order of February 23, 1954, is his 
allegation that the orders of August 26 and February 10 
were erroneous. ij:e does not contend in his brief that the 
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challenged orders were void. Therefore there is no question 
before this Court on appeal concerning the denial below of 
relief to appellant under 60 (b) (5), which pertains to void 
judgments. It therefore appears that the only question 
before the Court at this time is whether or not appellant 
should have been given the relief for which he petitioned 
under 60 (b) (7)-the "any other reason" clause-because 
of the alleged errors committed by the court in issuing the 
prior orders of August 26 and February 10. Put another 
way, the question is whether or not the single fact that a 
prior judgment is erroneous justifies vacating that judg-
ment under 60 (b) (7), under the circumstances of the 
present case. 
The importance of these circumstances cannot be ex-
aggerated. It must be remembered that appellant failed to 
appeal from the challenged orders, that no excuse of any 
kind has been offered for this failure, and that his peti-
tion to vacate was filed long after the time limits for ap-
pealing the challenged orders had lapsed. The respondent's 
position is that these circumstances required that appel-
lant be denied the relief sought below, and that they pre-
clude relief from the allegedly erroneous judgments under 
60 (b) (7); The matters and issues discussed by appellant 
in his brief would have been appropriate and pertinent on 
direct appeal from the challenged orders. As will be shown, 
they do not justify relief under 60 (b) (7); and this is true 
even though it be assumed that the allegations of error in 
appellant's brief pertaining to the challenged orders are 
all correct. Even if the orders of August 26 and February 
10 are assumed to be as erroneous as appellant alleges, in 
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other words, this is still insufficient to justify granting 
appellant relief under 60 (b) (7). If the court below had 
granted the petition to vacate, it would have committed 
reversible error in so doing; therefore any incidental error 
committed below was harmless to appellant. 
Rule 60 (b) (7) is broad enough in its terms to include 
anything thought by a court to justify relief from a judg-
ment, and the question here arises as to what limitations 
the rule is subject, if any. The respondent's position is, and 
the cases hold, that the rule is limited to exclude relief to 
appellant under the present circumstances. Relief under 
60 (b) is intended to be in the nature of equitable relief 
in order to subserve the ends of plain justice under certain 
circumstances. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., ... Utah ... , 
260 P. 2d 741, 742, 743. It is not intended to be a circuitous 
route by which the time limitation for taking appeals may 
be avoided. Relief thereunder may not be had for errors 
correctible on appeal when there is no sufficient excuse for 
failing to appeal, which is the exact situation here. 
As stated above, 60 (b) (7), U. R. C. P., is the same as 
60 (b) ( 6) , Federal R. C. P. The rule has been construed 
in a number of federal cases, chief among which is Acker-
mann v. United States, 340 U. S. 193, 95 L. Ed. 207, 71 
S. Ct. 209, (1950) which involved the interpretation and 
effect of federal rule 60 (b) ( 6) . In that case, the plaintiff 
moved the District Court to vacate a judgment which de-
naturalized him. The motion was denied there and in the 
Court of Appeals, and certiorari was obtained. The Su-
preme Court affirmed. The plaintiff had failed to appeal 
the judgment sought to be vacated, and the question before 
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the Court was whether or not the plaintiff alleged circum-
stances showing that his failure to appeal was justifiable. 
The circumstances alleged were that ( 1) the challenged 
judgment was erroneous as shown by reversal of a com-
panion case on appeal; (2) plaintiff did not appeal because 
he was advised by his attorney that he would have to sell 
his home to pay the costs thereof ; and ( 3) the government 
officer having plaintiff in custody as an alien advised him 
not to appeal. The court said, p. 212 L. Ed.: 
"Neither the circumstances of petitioner nor 
his excuse for not appealing is so extraordinary as 
tobringhimwithin * * * Rule60(b) (6)." 
The plaintiff there presented circumstances tending 
to excuse his failure to appeal the challenged judgment, 
whereas the appellant here offers no excuse at all. 
In an opinion by Hand, J., the court in United States 
v. Borchers, (1947, C. A. 2d N. Y.) 163 F. 2d 347, 350, 
cert. denied 332 U. S. 811, 92 L. Ed. 389, 68 S. Ct. 108, 
held that: 
"* * * Motions to open and vacate do not 
lie as a substitute for a deliberately abandoned 
appeal * * * " 
Denial of a motion under 60 (b) was affirmed in Gil-
more v. Hinman, (1951 C. A. D. C.) 191 F. 2d 652, the court 
there saying : 
"No other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment appears, and a motion of 
this sort cannot be used as a substitute for an ap-
peal." 
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Perrin v. Aluminum Co. of America, (1952, C. A. 
9th) 197 F. 2d 254, was an appeal from a denial of motions 
to vacate under Federal Rule 60 (b) (6). The court af-
firmed, failing to find that the lower court abused its 
discretion in any particular. The court said: 
" * * Rule 60 (b) was not intended to be 
resorted to as an alternative to review by appeal, 
nor as a means of enlarging by indirection the time 
for appeal except in compelling circumstances where 
justice requires that course * * *. Appellants 
had opportunity to obtain appellate review of the 
very rulings of which they now complain but failed 
to take advantage of the opportunity within the time 
prescribed by Rule 73 (a). Having in consequence 
of their own lack of diligence been turned away at 
the front door they now seek entry at the rear. 
Certainly Rule 60 (b) was not designed to afford 
machinery whereby an aggrieved party may circum-
vent the policy evidenced by the rule limiting the 
time for appeal * * *" 
The rule of these cases was followed in M orse-Starrett 
Pr'Oducts Co. v. Steccone, (1953, C. A. 9th) 205 F. 2d 244, 
249, affirming denial of a motion under Federal Rule 
60 (b) (6). 
Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Barrett, (1954, C. A. 5th) 213 
F. 2d 776, 779, 780, is the latest federal case in point, in-
volving the same clauses of 60 (b) as were used by appel-
ant here to support his petition to vacate. There, an appeal 
was taken from a judgment which dissolved a permanent 
injunction and vacated the prior final judgment under 
60 (b). The appellate court affirmed dissolution of the in-
junction under Federal Rule 60 (b) ( 5), which is the same 
as our Rule 60 (b) (6), but reversed the order vacating the 
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prior judgment under Federal Rule 60 (b) (4, 6). The court 
discussed the clause pertaining to void judgments on page 
779, and found the challenged judgment to be erroneous 
but not void. Then, at page 780, considering the applica-
tion of Federal Rule 60(b) (6) to an erroneous judgment, 
the court said : 
"The mere fact that the judgment was erron-
eous does not constitute 'any other reason justifying 
relief' from it. Again, appellees' remedy was to ap-
peal directly from the erroneous judgment and have 
it set aside in due course (citing Ackermann case). 
Rule 60 (b), supra, was not intended as, and it is not, 
a substitute for a direct appeal from an erroneous 
judgment. This rule was not designed to 'circum-
vent the policy evidenced by the rule limiting the 
time for appeal' (citing Perrin case) * * * " 
The appellant comes before this Court urging nothing 
in support of his contention that it was error to deny him 
relief under 60 (b) (5, 7) but that the judgments sought to 
be vacated are erroneous. He points to no alleged error 
which could not have been corrected on appeal, yet he 
offers no excuse for his failure to appeal. He therefore 
cannot prevail. 
POINT II. 
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S PETITION TO 
VACATE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED FOR THE 
REASON THAT IT WAS NOT FILED WITH-
IN A REASONABLE TIME AS REQUIRED BY 
RULE 60(b). 
Appellant's petition to vacate was filed more than 
seven months after the order of August 26, after compliance 
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with that order for several months by the appellant, and 
nearly three months after the order of February 10. It 
must be remembered that these challenged orders were not 
taken in default of appearance by the appellant, but re-
sulted from contested, adversary proceedings. There was 
no showing, nor any attempt to show, that conditions at 
the time of the petition were not the same as when the 
challenged orders issued. Not even the slightest excuse or 
justification has been offered by the appellant for the delay 
in attacking those orders. No excuse whatsoever has been 
offered for the failure to appeal from them, and no equitable 
reason is suggested to justify the extraordinary relief 
sought under 60 (h) . Society, the parties, and the courts 
have too great an interest in the permanence and stability 
of final judgments to permit them to be attacked without 
excuse or justification after so unreasonable a delay. The 
dismissal below of appellant's petition to vacate should be 
affirmed for the good and sufficient reason that it was not 
filed within a reasonable time as contemplated by Rule 
60 (b). 
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CONCLUSION 
In order to protect the permanence and stability of 
final judgments, this Court should affirm the dismissal of 
appellant's petition to vacate on the grounds that it was 
not filed within the reasonable time required by Rule 
60(b). 
In order to protect the integrity of our Rule 73 (a), 
and to prevent abuse of the desirable procedure established 
by Rule 60 (b), this Court should reject the contentions of 
appellant that erroneous judgments may be vacated under 
60 (b) for that reason alone and despite an unexcused 
failure to appeal them. The avenue provided by 60 (b) 
should be left open wide for those who desire to enter for 
good cause shown, but it should be closed against those who 
attempt thereby to circumvent without sufficient cause the 
appellate procedure established by our Rules. 
The judgment of February 23, 1954, dismissing ap-
pellant's petition to vacate should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
WOODRUFF C. GWYNN, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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